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Discouraging Voluntary Disclosure: EEOC v. C.R.
England and Confidentiality Under the ADA
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers
who ask for disability information must keep it confidential.1
However, the statute is silent as to whether employers must also
keep voluntary disclosures confidential.2
James Kingston had been working as a supervisor for The Ford
Meter Box Company for three years before he was diagnosed with
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.3 This disease progressively
made his breathing more difficult when he performed any sort of
physical labor, even walking short distances.4 After his diagnosis, he
disclosed his illness to the plant nurse, who gave him information
about requesting medical leave.5 After his supervisor requested that
Kingston spend more time on the production floor, Kingston
responded by telling him about his condition, but he did not ask for
any accommodations at that time.6
Because his disease continued to worsen in the year after his
diagnosis, Kingston had a meeting with the plant nurse and his
supervisor to discuss accommodations.7 He requested at this time
that they keep his condition confidential.8 Although his supervisor
told him at this time that Kingston could send his assistant to
meetings that were located up a floor and across the plant, later
conversations with his supervisor made him feel “compelled to go
the meetings,” so he did his best to attend rather than send his
assistant.9 Other coworkers told him that his condition was a topic of
conversation at a production meeting that he did not attend.10 When

1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006).
2. See id.
3. Kingston v. Ford Meter Box Co., No. 3:07-CV-270 RM, 2009 WL 981333, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2009).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. However, the court notes that the defendant filed affidavits contradicting
Kingston’s assertion that other coworkers talked about his condition at a meeting. Id. at *3
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Kingston brought a lawsuit for disability discrimination, the court
held that because he had told his supervisor and the plant nurse
about his condition voluntarily before requesting reasonable
accommodations, his medical information was not protected under
the ADA.11 Thus, the court implied that employees who proactively
tell employers about potential problems are not protected, but
instead must wait until their job performance suffers, prompting
their employers to initiate a disability inquiry or request medical
documents.12
In a similar case, EEOC v. C.R. England,13 the Tenth Circuit
held that the ADA does not protect an employee’s disclosures to his
supervisor. Rather than rewarding a proactive employee for telling
his supervisor before his condition became a problem, C.R. England
required the employee to divulge his medical condition to others and
restricted his actions. This opinion will discourage voluntary
discourse about disabilities between employees and employers,
departing from Congress’s intent in enacting the ADA. This Note
argues that although the ADA does not directly address voluntary
disclosures of medical information, the Tenth Circuit should have
interpreted the ADA to protect employees’ voluntary disclosures
even where the employer has not made a special inquiry about the
disability.
Part II of this Note first discusses the applicable ADA provisions,
their legislative history, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s enforcement regulations and guidance. Next, Part III
examines case law leading up to EEOC v. C.R. England, and
discusses the difficulty in determining whether a disclosure is actually
voluntary. As will be apparent from this discussion, the slight
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disclosures does not
justify the differences in outcome. Part IV discusses the facts and the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis in EEOC v. C.R. England. Part V argues that
the Tenth Circuit’s holding is contrary to Congress’s intent in
passing the ADA, contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s guidance, and discourages voluntary employee
disclosures through bad workplace policy that encourages both
employees and employers to remain silent about disabilities, thus

n.3.
11. Id. at *11.
12. See id. at *9–10 (distinguishing cases holding that the employer initiated the inquiry
and thus was legally bound to keep the information confidential).
13. 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2011).
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leading to a less productive disabled workforce. Part VI proposes two
possible solutions: voluntary disclosures about possible disabilities
could be treated like confidential medical records under the ADA;
Or in the alternative, information could be disclosed only when
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”14 Part VII
concludes.
II. SECTION 12112(D) OF THE ADA AND THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
MEDICAL INFORMATION
A. The ADA and What the Legislature Intended
The ADA was meant to herald a new day of understanding for
people with disabilities and allow them “the opportunity to compete
on an equal basis with others.”15 Prior to the statute, people with
disabilities had been segregated from regular society, treated as
worthless or nonexistent, and discriminated against solely on the
basis of their disabilities.16 The legislative history recounted Judith
Heumann’s experience, where her elementary school forbade her
from attending and entertainment venues asked her to leave because
she was confined to a wheelchair.17 Some employers refused to offer
jobs to qualified applicants with disabilities, even where the applicant
did not need accommodations and had a “hidden,” or not obviously
visible, disability.18 Some individuals were discriminated against even
though they did not consider themselves disabled.19 The public
associated disability with ineptness, leading many disabled individuals

14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2011).
15. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 22–23, 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304, 310. (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and
to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to
provide enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities,
and to ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on
behalf of individuals with disabilities.”).
16. Id. at 28–29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310–11.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355. Individuals with a history of or
who were successfully treating “hidden” disabilities, such as diabetes, epilepsy, or many
emotional or mental illnesses, could still be required to disclose their conditions on job
applications before Congress passed the ADA. Id.
19. Congress drafted the ADA broadly enough to encompass these individuals, stating
that disability is defined independently of any “mitigating measures” taken by the individual,
and that those individuals stigmatized by a past history of a disability—even if they physically
no longer have it—are also covered under the ADA. Id. at 52–53, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334–35.
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to be under-employed, unnecessarily dependent on others, or
indigent.20
Congress passed the ADA to ameliorate these problems. Section
12112 of the ADA forbids employment discrimination: “No covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”21 The statute regulates employers’ inquiries about
disabilities at all stages of employment, including before the
employment offer, after the offer, and after the person is an
employee.22 Employers can inquire only whether an employee can
physically perform the job, an inquiry that can take the form of a
physical or an employer-instigated inquiry into an employee’s
medical history if “job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”23 This inquiry must be about a person’s ability to perform
“job-related functions”24 and cannot extend specifically to a person’s
disabled status.25 Employers may also make “voluntary medical
examinations” available in conjunction with “an employee health
program available to all employees at that work site.”26
When an employer obtains health information through these
allowed methods, it must be “maintained on separate forms and in
separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical
record.”27 But the information can be shared with supervisors to
inform them of “necessary restrictions” and “necessary
accommodations,” with “first aid and safety personnel” in case of
emergency, and with government officials to show compliance with
the ADA.28

20. Id. at 32–33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314–15.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
22. Id. § 12112(d).
23. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
24. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
25. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
26. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B). This provision was meant to include jobs that require regular
physicals or that offer health exams due to hazards found on the job site. H.R. REP. NO. 101485(II), at 74–75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356–58.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
28. Id. Practitioners have also added two other instances where the information may be
shared. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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B. EEOC Guidelines Regarding Disability Inquiries

The Tenth Circuit’s opinion conflicts with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the ADA.
Congress authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to broadly implement and enforce the ADA
employment provisions.29 To provide clarity to employers wishing to
abide by these provisions, the EEOC promulgated guidelines to
provide notice to employers about what kinds of inquiries are
acceptable under the ADA.30 The EEOC guidelines first emphasize
the aim of the ADA to “protect the rights of applicants and
employees to be assessed on merit alone, while protecting the rights
of employers to ensure that individuals in the workplace can
efficiently perform the essential functions of their jobs.”31 The
guidelines stress that any medical exams and inquiries must be “jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.”32 Notably, the
guidelines state that while employers must keep confidential any
information gained from employer-initiated disability inquiries,
employers are also required to protect any medical information
voluntarily disclosed by an employee33—an area the statute does not
clearly address.34 Thus, the EEOC guidelines implement a
straightforward standard that is easy to understand and apply.
III. CASE LAW ON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES
Although most courts have held that voluntary disclosures are
not protected by the ADA, courts disagree on what constitutes a
voluntary disclosure. This suggests that courts should discard the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disclosures and simply
protect all medical information. Only two circuit courts have ruled
on the issue, and numerous district courts have defined voluntary
disclosures with varying success. None of these decisions have
addressed Congress’s intent in passing the ADA or the EEOC’s
determination that there should be no difference between medical

29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (2011).
30. Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
EEOC,
Employees
Under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html (last visited February 1, 2012).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006).
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information gained through an employer inquiry and medical
information given voluntarily.
Some courts have held that the confidentiality provisions were
meant to be a strict ceiling. In Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., a court
interpreted the ADA confidentiality provisions narrowly and held
that an employer need not keep disability information confidential if
an employer discovers that information through any means outside
of an employer-initiated exam or inquiry.35 Thus, when the employee
in Ballard told his supervisor about his HIV, the ADA did not apply
since the voluntary disclosure of disability “is not a matter that the
ADA was designed to handle.”36
However, not all courts have interpreted the statute this
narrowly. This strict-ceiling interpretation was directly criticized in
Lanxon v. Crete Carrier Corp.37 In this case, an employer’s medical
review officer “found out about” an employee’s seizures and
informed other employees through phone calls and emails about her
condition.38 The judge criticized any reliance on the Ballard
holding, since it would suggest that information gained through an
ADA-prohibited inquiry would not need to be kept confidential
because the information had not been gained as part of a legal
inquiry.39 If those inquiries had been “job-related and consistent
with business necessity,” then they may have been permissible under
the ADA.40 The judge further reasoned that the employer “had no
right to obtain the information in the first place” when it was gained
outside of employer-initiated inquiries or voluntary wellness
programs, implying that information gained outside of those
methods should be protected even more strictly.41
Most courts continue to follow the strict ceiling reasoning found
in Ballard, holding that employers are not liable for disclosing
medical information to other employees, even where the employee
discloses a condition when requesting medical leave to treat it.42 In
Ross v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers, Inc., an employee

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Kingston
2009).
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147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534–35 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
Id. at 535.
No. 4:00CV3182, 2001 WL 1589627 at *11 (D. Neb. Dec. 13, 2001).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Walker v. Gambrell, 647 F. Supp. 2d 529, 539 n.5 (D. Md. 2009); see also
v. Ford Meter Box Co., 3:07-CV-270 RM, 2009 WL 981333 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 10,
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called her supervisor to ask for time off so that she could start taking
medication for her bipolar disorder, for which she was recently
diagnosed.43 The supervisor then discussed her diagnosis with at least
one other employee.44 The district court reasoned that while the
supervisor’s actions were “ill-mannered,” mostly because the
voluntarily disclosed information involved mental illness, the ADA
does not protect self-disclosures.45 Rather than err on the side of
protecting medical information, the court reasoned that it is an
everyday occurrence for an employee to call a supervisor, explain the
medical reason for an absence, and then for the supervisor to tell
everyone else in the workplace, whether or not the information
could be sensitive.46
Where an employer requests documents detailing medical
information, courts are split on whether the confidentiality
provisions of the ADA cover that information. In Cash v. Smith—an
Eleventh Circuit case and the only other federal circuit case handling
this issue—an employee told her supervisor in confidence about a
number of health problems.47 The employee supplied her supervisor,
upon the employer’s request, with medical documents detailing her
medical conditions.48 The supervisor later told other employees
about Cash’s medical conditions.49 Because the employee initiated
this inquiry by informing her employer about her medical condition,

43. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1033 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
44. Id. at 1028.
45. Id. at 1033–34.
46. Id. at 1033 (“An employee may take leave due to influenza, a stomach virus, a
broken leg, cancer, congestive heart failure, or some other medical condition and inform the
employer of that medical condition; and when that happens it is common for the information
to be spread around the workplace. Nothing in the statute or the cases gives reason to believe
that the ADA prohibits that kind of disclosure.”). But see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 75
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357–58 (observing that cancer sufferers are
often seen as having a disability, so their medical condition may also be a sensitive matter that
they would not want spread around the workplace).
47. 231 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 1304, 1307. Even though Cash’s medical conditions were not held to be a
disability because they were managed through medications, the interpretation of the ADA has
changed so that mitigating measures are not taken into consideration when deciding if
someone has a disability. See WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 138 (3d ed. 2010) (setting out checklists for trying ADA cases that
differentiate between cases before or after Jan. 1, 2009).
49. Cash, 231 F.3d at 1308. This case is not always the best confidentiality case because
Cash also told others in the office besides her supervisor about her condition, thus
contradicting her later claim that she wanted to keep her medical condition a secret. Since the
court only examined whether she voluntarily gave the information to her supervisor in making
its holding, Cash’s decision to tell other employees did not impact its holding.
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the court held that her condition did not have to be kept
confidential.50 This holding contrasts with the holding in Doe v. U.S.
Postal Service, where a supervisor required an employee to submit a
medical certification form to request time off.51 Although the
employee voluntarily submitted the form, the court held that the
employer’s request for the medical leave certification form was
effectively a “job-related” inquiry, and thus that the information
should have been kept confidential according to the ADA.52
Even if viewed in terms of the timeline for the employer requests,
the difference between voluntary disclosures and employer requests is
very narrow. In both cases, the employer requested information from
the employee. In Cash, the employee requested accommodation
first; then her employer asked for her medical records.53 In Doe, the
employee had to turn in a medical certification form in order to ask
for leave in the first place.54 In Cash, the medical condition disclosure
was voluntary;55 in Doe, the medical condition disclosure was
involuntary.56 This small chronological difference, requested after
initial time-off request versus requested at the same time as initial
time-off request, seems too narrow to be an important difference.
These cases suggest that the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary disclosures is difficult to determine, leading to the
conclusion that courts should not be distinguishing between them.
In addition, the strict-ceiling interpretation that the ADA only
protects involuntary disclosures connected to employer medical
inquiries would not protect other circumstances where employers
gain medical information from sources other than the employee.
None of these cases address the ADA legislative history or the
reasoning behind the EEOC guidelines.
IV. EEOC V. C.R. ENGLAND
The Tenth Circuit continued this trend of holding that the ADA
does not protect an employee’s voluntary disclosures to his
supervisor. It reasoned that even if the disclosed information gives

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

566

Id. at 1307–08.
317 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 344–45.
231 F.3d at 1304, 1307.
317 F.3d at 341.
231 F.3d at 1307.
317 F.3d at 341.

JONES - JESSICA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

559

3/20/2012 11:55 AM

Discouraging Voluntary Disclosure

other employees the opportunity to discriminate or harass, voluntary
disclosures are still not protected.
A. Facts
Walter Watson was diagnosed with HIV in 1999 and started
working for the trucking company C.R. England (CRE) in 2002.57
He signed an agreement to become an independent contractor and
began leasing a truck from CRE’s sister company about one month
after beginning work at CRE.58 Watson voluntarily told CRE’s
human resources manager, Carrie Johansen, that he was HIV
positive, mainly because he believed that a driver with whom he had
had a confrontation had already informed her,59 perhaps in an effort
to control the damage.
Although she had previously assured Watson of confidentiality,
Johansen pulled him aside during his “train-the-trainer” sessions to
express her concerns and later arranged a meeting with both Watson
and CRE’s legal counsel.60 Legal counsel suggested that potential
trainees should know about Watson’s HIV-positive status and asked
for Watson’s input on how this could be accomplished.61 Watson
suggested a form, which CRE’s attorney later drafted, that informed
potential trainees that their trainer was HIV positive.62 This form did
not specifically name Watson.63 Potential trainees would have the
opportunity to reject the HIV-positive trainer without knowing
specifically who it was, but those who signed the form would be
assigned to Watson,64 thus suggesting that Watson was the trainer
with HIV. Watson never told CRE about any objections to telling
others about his HIV or about using the trainee form.65 His one
trainee, Eddie Seastrunk, signed the form without complaint.66
However, Watson’s first trip as a trainer did not go well and he was
fired one week after being assigned a trainee.67

57. EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 2011).
58. Id.
59. Id. at n.1.
60. Id. at 1033.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (showing that only Watson’s potential trainees were given the opportunity to
sign the form and it was not given to every trainee).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1033–34.
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Watson filed a complaint with the EEOC, which in turn found
that CRE violated Watson’s rights under the ADA by disclosing his
HIV and by requiring Watson to disclose it to potential trainees.68
However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
CRE.69
B. Tenth Circuit Analysis
The Tenth Circuit ultimately upheld the summary judgment in
favor of CRE, holding that the ADA does not apply to voluntarily
disclosed medical information, even if it relates to a disability.70
Although the court made eight holdings in this case, only the
decision regarding whether the ADA protects voluntary disclosures
will be discussed in this Note. The court interpreted § 12112 of the
ADA, stating that it was meant to cover “medical examinations and
inquiries”71 performed “(a) preemployment; (b) post-offer; and (c)
during the employment relationship.”72 The court also reasoned that
any medical information gathered as part of a legitimate inquiry has
to be treated as a confidential medical record and “maintained on
separate forms and in separate medical files.”73 Any disclosure of that
confidential medical record would be actionable under the ADA.74
In this case, however, the court held that Watson’s voluntary
admission made those statute sections inapplicable.75 The only
voluntary information that the statute protects, according to the
court’s interpretation, is information “elicited during an authorized
employment-related medical examination or inquiry.”76 The court
reasoned that because the statute does not address voluntarily given
information from an employee, “it perforce cannot be interpreted as
extending the protections of 102(d)’s confidentiality restrictions.”77
The court explained that although the “co-worker consent policy”
may have violated the ADA,78 the voluntary disclosure and lack of

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

568

Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1046.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.14(c)(1), (d)(1) (2011)).
Id. at 1046–47.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
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adverse employment action in this particular case absolved CRE from
liability.79
V. ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Tenth Circuit’s holding is contrary to congressional intent,
agency interpretation, and public policy. Because Congress specified
that the ADA would protect people who self-identified as disabled to
prove ADA compliance, it seems that Congress might have wanted
to protect all voluntary disclosures. The court rejected the easy-toapply EEOC guidelines that do not draw distinctions between
voluntary and involuntary disclosures; its holding will instead add to
the current confusion about what disclosures are protected. Finally,
its holding will discourage voluntary disclosure because those with
medical problems will not share that information with their employer
in the early stages before problems arise. This will lead to a less
productive disabled workforce, which is against public policy.
A. Contrary to Congressional Intent
The Tenth Circuit’s holding that voluntary disclosures are not
protected under the ADA is contrary to Congress’s intent. The
legislative history indicates that Congress intended medical
information to stay confidential; employers could not use the
medical information to “prevent[] occupational advancement.”80
Legislators were also concerned that employees would be
stigmatized if employers could ask about health status without a
legitimate purpose.81 The ADA permits employers to ask employees
to self-identify as a person with a disability for purposes of showing
compliance with the ADA or other government programs, but any
solicitation for these identifications must note that the disability
information will be kept confidential.82 The requirement that
employers keep this self-identifying information confidential seems
to suggest that Congress might have wanted to protect all voluntary
79. Id. at 1039–40, n.12.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 75 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
357.
81. Id. at 75–76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357–58. As an example,
Congress noted that if a person started losing hair, it would be inappropriate for the employer
to require the employee to be tested for cancer unless that test was “job-related.” Id. at 75,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357. Since people suffering from cancer are viewed as
disabled, this unnecessary inquiry would make the employee feel the “blatant and subtle
stigma” from being labeled disabled. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358.
82. Id.

569

JONES - JESSICA.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 11:55 AM

2012

disclosures about disabilities. Although many companies have private
policies that condemn disclosures of private employee information,83
Congress still wrote confidentiality provisions into the ADA,
suggesting that Congress believed federal protection of disability
information was necessary because private employer actions were
inadequate.
While there may be some argument that Congress did not intend
to bind employers when employees voluntarily disclose medical
information, certain employee actions already trigger ADA
consequences without the employer taking the first step.84 Congress
hoped that employees and employers would engage in “an
interactive process that requires participation by both sides” when
working out reasonable accommodations for disabilities,85 a process
that necessarily demands trust on both sides. Thus, an interpretation
of the ADA that gives employees reason to trust their employers
when deciding whether to divulge confidential disability information
prior to asking for a reasonable accommodation seems more in line
with congressional intent.
B. Contrary to Agency Interpretation
By interpreting the ADA contrary to agency interpretation, the
Tenth Circuit has chosen to reinforce a confusing outcome at the
expense of a simple solution. Because the statute was silent in regards
to medical information gained outside of employer-instigated
inquiries, the EEOC interpreted the statute as protecting voluntary
disclosures.86 Protecting all disclosures of medical information
provided an easier-to-apply standard that trying to decide when the
disclosure was truly voluntary and thus covered under the ADA.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this interpretation was not
correct because it was contrary to the plain language of the statute.87
While the court acknowledged that the EEOC’s interpretation
“constitute[s] a body of experience and informed judgment to which

83. See, e.g., Ross v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025,
1028 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (concluding that Ross’s supervisor violated company policy when he
disclosed her condition).
84. See C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1048–50 (analyzing whether Watson’s actions
invoked the need for CRE to offer reasonable accommodations).
85. Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., 374 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Templeton v. Neodata Servs. Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
86. EEOC, supra note 30.
87. C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1047 n.16.
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courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,”88 that was not
enough to persuade the court to protect voluntary disclosures.
Rather than discussing how the court’s interpretation created better
outcomes than the EEOC’s, the Tenth Circuit only states that the
agency interpretation is not controlling and appears to be internally
inconsistent.89
C. Contrary to Public Policy
The Tenth Circuit’s holding creates bad policy for employees
and employers. Disabled employees, fearing the stigma of coworkers,
will not openly discuss their medical conditions until their job
performance starts to suffer. Its holding also insulates employers who
enable discrimination and harassment through sharing information.
Finally, only bad public policy would hold that an employee forfeits
all interests in confidentiality by telling their supervisor about a
potential problem.
Holding that an employer has no obligation under the ADA to
keep voluntarily-disclosed information confidential discourages
employees from seeking reasonable accommodations and might lead
to decreased workplace effectiveness for those who need
accommodations. Employees receive accommodations to help them
perform their jobs. If employees know that their employer has no
duty to keep their information private, those who fear stigma and
harassment will not approach their supervisors. Thus, they will not
get the accommodations they need to perform their jobs well. Rather
than opening the discourse with their employer early, trusting in the
ADA’s confidentiality protection, these employees will only ask for a
reasonable accommodation as a last resort. Work performed without
the reasonable accommodation will be less effective than work
performed with the needed accommodation.
In addition, this holding insulates employers who distribute
information that permits other employees to discriminate on the
basis of disabilities. Sharing medical information allows other
employees to discriminate based on information they would not have
otherwise had. Discrimination often leads to harassment,90

88. Id. (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 n.5 (10th Cir.
1999)).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (where
coworkers called Shaver “platehead” and treated him condescendingly after his supervisor
disclosed Shaver’s medical information).
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something that employers should be held liable for facilitating
through information distribution. While the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that this situation might violate the ADA in certain
circumstances,91 its holding clearly allows this very type of situation
to occur.
It is also bad public policy to argue that employees forfeit all
interests in confidentiality when they speak confidentially to
supervisors about medical problems. Employees have the greatest
claim to confidentiality when an employer solicits information, as
seen in the number of cases protecting medical information even
when the employee is not necessarily disabled.92 But employees do
not authorize a supervisor to share that information purely because
they proactively told their supervisors about potential problems
before their employer asked. Regardless of whether the employer or
the employee initiated the conversation regarding disabilities, the
possible stigma connected to disability remains the same.
Since the Tenth Circuit’s holding in EEOC v. C.R. England is
contrary to congressional intent, agency interpretation, and good
workplace public policy, future circuit courts examining whether the
ADA protects voluntary disclosures should approach the issue
differently. Future holdings that examine congressional intentions,
and account for agency interpretations will result in better workplace
public policy.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Future courts examining whether the ADA protects medical
information should choose solutions that protect employee medical
information while still giving employers easy-to-apply standards with
predictable results. One obvious solution is for employers to keep all
medical information, especially about potential disabilities,
confidential according to the guidelines set out by the EEOC.
Practitioners have interpreted the provisions allowing disclosure to
include the following recipients: 1) other supervisors, who may be
told about the disability as needed to provide reasonable
accommodations or allow medical leave; 2) emergency personnel,
who may know for purposes of medical treatment; 3) government
officials, who may obtain information to investigate compliance with
the ADA and state workers’ compensation laws; and 4) insurance
91. C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1042.
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 n.1 (2011) (citing cases that have held that plaintiffs have a
cause of action under ADA if information from an acceptable inquiry is divulged).
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companies, who may know for insurance purposes.93 These narrow
exceptions would allow the employee to control who would know
about the disability and provide legal remedy for workplace
harassment.94
Another possible solution is to allow employers to divulge
voluntarily disclosed medical information only if it is “job-related
and consistent with business necessity.”95 Thus, employers can tell
fellow employees about the condition where there are safety
concerns due to specific job conditions. Employer actions, such as
the emergency protocol for seizures in Lanxon v. Crete Carrier
Corp.,96 could possibly fit the job-related requirement, helping more
employers feel comfortable about working with those who have
disabilities because they can inform other employees about a
particular disability when it is a business necessity without violating
the ADA. Having this requirement in place would discourage
employer divulgences that serve no purpose except providing fodder
for workplace gossip, such as the “ill-mannered” disclosure of an
employee’s mental illness in Ross v. Advance America Cash Advance
Centers, Inc.97
Here, even if CRE had argued that the disclosure forms were
related to a business necessity, that of keeping other drivers from
contracting a contagious disease, this would be a flimsy excuse at
best. The EEOC states that a “direct threat due to a medical
condition must be based on objective evidence obtained, or
reasonably available to the employer” and specifically addresses the
objective threat posed by an employee with HIV.98 EEOC v. C.R.
England did not have any of those justifications for requiring HIV
disclosure.99

93. GOREN, supra note 48, at 41; see also Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee
Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433
(1993) (discussing the need for employees to feel that they have some control over the
sensitive information held by their employers).
94. For examples of workplace harassment for disabilities that do not rise to the level of
actionable “hostile environment,” see MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT 34 (2007).
While many courts have recognized that there is a cause of action available under the ADA for
a hostile work environment, few cases survive summary judgment. Brian L. Porto, Annotation,
Actions Under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), to Remedy Alleged
Harassment or Hostile Work Environment, 162 A.L.R. FED. 603 (2011).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (2011)
96. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
98. EEOC, supra note 30.
99. See id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In holding that an employee’s voluntary disclosures about
disabilities are not confidential, the Tenth Circuit discouraged
voluntary discourse about disabilities, leading to a less-effective
disabled workforce in general. Its holding betrays the intentions of
Congress in passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, which
envisioned open communication and interaction about disabilities
between employers and employees. Its holding also creates bad
incentives for employees, who might delay telling supervisors about
disabilities for the fear of stigma brought about if an employer
divulges the information. If, instead, the Tenth Circuit had held that
medical information obtained from voluntary disclosures must be
protected like medical information obtained through accepted
methods, then employees would have more control over who
receives their information. Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit could
have held that voluntarily-disclosed medical information can be
shared when the justification is “job-related and consistent with
business necessity,” allowing employers to share the information
more readily, but still allowing some protection to the employee.
Future courts who consider whether the ADA protects voluntary
disclosures should consider congressional intent, the reasoning
behind the EEOC guidelines, and the public policy that their
decisions will encourage.
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